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Influential contemporary performance budgeting models have sought to tighten the link 
between results and budgets.  This paper considers three approaches – budget-linked 
performance targets, budgeting based upon output or outcome costs, and budgetary performance 
incentives – and assesses their potential to enhance the results/funding link.  It is possible to 
develop real links between performance targets and budgets, although generally not of a 
formularized nature.  Criticisms of performance targets, based particularly on the imperfections 
nature of performance indicators, tend to be somewhat exaggerated.  Considerably more use can 
be made of output cost information in budgeting – although there are important imitations arising 
from the nature of some outputs, and from the prevalence of qualitative rationing.  Initiatives 
designed to ensure that agency performance is systematically considered when deciding agency 
budget allocations are highly desirable.  The idea of additional funding as a reward for good 
performance needs, however, to be approached cautiously and selectively. 
 
The Background to Recent Performance Budgeting Initiatives 
Performance budgeting may be defined as the systematic use in the budget process of 
performance information generated by formal performance information systems
1 in order to 
make results a central determinant of budget funding decisions, and thereby make budgeting a  
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powerful instrument for maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of government.  This is a 
broad definition of performance budgeting, making it an overarching concept which includes 
within it systems such as program budgeting, zero based budgeting, output purchase budgeting 
and a number of other mechanisms and systems which strive to take budgeting beyond financial 
control into the realm of performance enhancement. 
Essentially, performance budgeting seeks to build budgeting systems and institutions 
which can play a major role in addressing the allocative and productive efficiency problems 
which arise from the non-market nature of government service provision.  Non-market provision 
implies reliance upon tax financing and, unlike revenue earned by selling products on the market, 
tax revenue is not a function of success in meeting consumer needs.  The consequence of this is, 
of course, the absence of the most fundamentally important market performance discipline.   
Reliance upon tax revenue also makes it necessary that agency expenditure be subject to hard 
budget constraints which reflect aggregate fiscal policy parameters, and these hard budget 
constraints themselves create additional performance problems.  In the short run, for example, 
they greatly limit the flexibility available to agencies to respond to unanticipated fluctuations in 
the need/demand for services. 
In respect to allocative efficiency, the bête noire of performance budgeting has long been 
‘incremental’ budgeting.  As is well known, the initial wave of post-second world war 
performance budgeting systems sought to replace budgetary incrementalism with a system of 
comprehensive central expenditure planning.  The hope was thereby to deliver some 
approximation of allocative optimization as conceptualized by welfare economics.  Experience 
with Program Budgeting, in the form originally introduced in the US in the 1960s (PPBS), and 
with similar systems made it clear that this goal was too ambitious.  As budget scholars like  
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Aaron Wildavsky pointed out, it is simply impossible for central budgetary decision-makers to 
gather enough information to fine-tune all expenditure in order to maximize social benefits.   
Today, the point seems an obvious one, given the systematic way in which information limits 
and costs have been built into theory in economics and other fields, and also the historical 
experience of the informational limits of central planning, as exemplified on a grand scale by the 
failure of centrally planned economies. 
There were two other key problems with the initial version of program budgeting.  One 
was that it tended to ignore productive efficiency.  The other was that it adopted an essentially 
static approach to allocative efficiency, and lacked a forward-looking perspective. 
Budgeters learnt from these experiences.  In respect to allocative efficiency, it is now 
widely – although unfortunately not universally – understood that central budget decision-
makers should focus their attention on broad sectoral expenditure allocations, and that it is both 
necessary and desirable that there should be substantial decentralized allocative decision making.  
A central element of a good performance budgeting system should be the creation of systems and 
institutions capable of ensuring that the sectoral budget allocations contained in the annual 
government budget are policy-driven, that they have the commitment of top political decision-
makers, and that they are responsive to changing needs and priorities (World Bank 1998).   
Generally speaking, improving allocative efficiency in central budget allocations is best seen as a 
process of iterative review and modification of current expenditure policies – as a process which 
is neither incrementalist nor comprehensive-planning in nature, but which represents something 
in between
2.   
Central budgetary decision-makers have also over recent year increasingly adopted a 
forward-looking perspective to the allocative task.  One of the most useful tools for this purpose  
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has proven to be ‘current policy’ forward expenditure estimates and projections.  These give 
advance warning of any inconsistency between current expenditure policies and fiscal 
rules/targets, and facilitate early policy adjustments to reconcile the two.  Initially, the focus was 
on relatively short-term projections (e.g. three years), but in more recent years an increasing 
number of countries have moved to longer-term expenditure projections (20 years or more), 
which offer the capacity to highlight potential fiscal problems arising from demographic and 
other relevant longer-term trends.  These developments are related to a broader set of multi-year 
budgeting initiatives. 
There is, thus, a quite significant degree of consensus as to what constitutes good practice 
in central budget allocative decision-making.  However, this still leaves a great deal unresolved 
as to what constitutes a good performance budgeting system.  A crucial issue, of course, 
concerns the manner in which the budgeting system can best contribute to improving productive 
efficiency.  Improved productive efficiency has, of course, been a central theme of public 
management over recent decades.  Many of the more recent models of performance budgeting 
have, by contrast to the overwhelmingly allocative preoccupation of program budgeting, placed 
at least as much emphasis upon productive as upon allocative efficiency.  Another key issue 
concerns the role of the central budget process in promoting good agency-level allocative 
decisions.  It may be impossible for the centre to ensure allocative efficiency by making all the 
expenditure decisions itself.  But might it not be possible to re-design the central budget system 
in such a way as to place much stronger pressure upon agencies to prioritize their expenditures to 
the most effective areas?  This is a matter to which performance budgeting innovators have 
devoted considerable attention.   
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In a 1990 multi-nation review of performance budgeting practice, Allen Schick noted that 
at that time “none of the governments have attempted to forge a tight relationship between 
resources or results” (1990, 32).  Since that time, things have changed markedly.  In a drive to 
use budgeting as an instrument to drive improved productive efficiency, and also to promote 
better agency-level allocative decisions, some key models of performance budgeting developed 
since the mid-1990s have strongly emphasized the creation of tighter linkage between results and 
budgets.  This paper examines these models. 
 
Building a Tighter Link between Budgets and Results 
A key theme of these new models of performance budgeting has been the creation of 
tighter ex ante linkages between results and budgets: in other words, upon ensuring that agency 
funding is closely related to the results which the agency is expected to deliver with those funds.  
Considerable attention has, however, also been paid to the development of ex post links between 
results and budgets through formalized budgetary incentives for the agency performance. 
Three particularly important strands of recent performance budgeting practice and theory 
may be identified: 
 
Performance Targets and Performance Budgeting 
One approach taken in a number of jurisdictions has been the setting of agency 
performance standards or targets which are intended to be clearly linked with funding decisions. 
A leading example of this model is the Public Service Agreements (PSA) framework in 
Britain.  The PSAs are documents which set out for each agency key objectives and a number of 
targets.  These ‘headline’ targets are relatively small in number (130 in total for the 2002-06  
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PSAs), and the great majority are now outcome targets.  For example, there are numerical targets 
for improving the literacy and numeracy outcomes of school children, and for reducing mortality 
rates from heart disease and cancer (UK Government 2002a).  The headline targets contained in 
PSAs are translated into ‘operational’ targets, many of which relate to outputs, activities, 
processes and inputs, with the intention that these targets should be more controllable and 
therefore more closely ‘owned’ by the agencies.  The aim is a creation of an interlinked 
‘cascading’ structure of targets (NAO 2001). 
Crucially, these targets are seen as having an important relationship with the budget.  
Upon coming to office in 1997, British Labor took the view that significant expenditure 
increases in some areas of inadequately-provided public services (e.g. health) where going to be 
unavoidable.  It was concerned, however, about the danger of sinking extra funds in without 
achieving the necessary service improvements.  A key part of the strategy has therefore been, in 
the words of Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) Gordon Brown, ‘tying new 
resources to new reform and results’ (UK Government 2002a, i). 
The notion of budget-linked performance targets is not, of course, unique to Britain.  One 
other well-known example is the Florida system of ‘performance-based program budgeting’, in 
which the annual budget legislation includes a set of output and outcome targets for each agency.   
 
Budgetary Performance Incentives  
What motivates agencies and public employees to deliver on performance expectations 
and targets?  This is a key question for any performance budgeting system.  A widespread 
assumption is that public reporting of performance information will in itself have a significant 
motivational effect.  Recent efforts in a number of countries to develop summary overall  
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performance measures and ‘report cards’ are designed to intensify that pressure – particularly 
through the ‘name and shame’ approach to poor performers.  A good recent example of this is 
the ‘comprehensive performance assessment’ initiative introduced in Britain in 2002, under 
which a balanced scorecard report including an overall performance rating is prepared for each 
local government, and distributed to all rate-payers.  The British also tend to emphasize the 
negative sanction of managerial ‘intervention’ (including, ultimately, sacking and replacement 
with new managers) for central agencies or local governments which are rated as performing 
badly. 
Performance pay – although not in any sense a new development – has also assumed an 
increasingly important role in many countries.  Thus, for example, the Bush administration’s 
‘strategic management of human capital initiative’ aims to substantially extend the role of 
performance pay in the US federal government.  The influence of business remuneration practice 
and of certain versions of agency theory has been an important factor in this.  A key unresolved 
issue here is the disjuncture between these efforts and the findings of the research literature 
which questions the efficacy of performance pay in the public sector (e.g. Ingraham 1993; 
Kellough and Lu 1993). 
Of particular interest from a performance budgeting perspective is the increased interest 
in recent years in budgetary incentives for agency performance.  The idea here is that stronger 
performance ‘incentives’ should be created by formalizing and strengthening the link between 
actual (as opposed to planned/expected) agency performance and subsequent funding.  Again, 
the business analogy is obvious – high-performing businesses are rewarded by the market with 
strong earnings.  
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Such linkages have over recent years been reasonably well established at the sectoral 
level.  One example is university funding systems in which it is now quite common in many 
countries for some portion of funding is based upon performance measures – and particularly 
upon outcome measures such as graduate job placements and graduations (Wellman 2001).   
What is newer is the idea of creating a similar linkage at the whole-of-government level.  The 
“budget and performance integration” initiative launched by the Bush administration as part of 
the President’s Management Agenda aims to create precisely such a linkage.  Concerned that 
there has in the past been “little reward, in budgets or in compensation, for running programs 
efficiently”, the administration set out to create a budgeting system in which “high performing 
programs will be reinforced and non-performing activities reformed or terminated” (Executive 
Office of the President/OMB 2002: 27-8).  For this purpose, the performance of programs is 
rated by OMB budget examiners using a Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) (OMB, 
2003)
 3. 
Systems of budgetary funding ‘incentives’ may vary in a number of ways including: 
•  The degree to which nexus between performance measure/rating and funding is automatic 
and formularized, 
•  Whether all funding is linked to actual performance, or alternatively there is an distinct 
performance-based funding component of overall funding, 
•  Whether the performance measures upon which the performance-linked funding is based are 
wholly ‘objective’ measures or, alternatively, upon measures which are partly judgmental. 
Not all advocates tighter results/budgets linkages support the idea of integrating formal 
budgetary performance rewards and penalties into the whole-of-government budgeting system.   
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Budgeting Based on the Costs of Delivering Results 
Another key theme in contemporary performance budgeting systems is the formularized 
linking of funding and results using cost information.  This is in no sense a new idea.  There is a 
long tradition of the advocacy of the application of management accounting tools to public 
budgeting.  In the last decade or so, however, there have been some quite bold and far-reaching 
attempts to put these ideas into practice.  In most cases, these have focused upon outputs rather 
than outcomes.  If, the reasoning goes, one can determine what it costs – or what it should cost – 
to produce an output, one has thereby established a functional relationship between budgets and 
the expected/planned levels of services which can then be used for budgeting purposes.   
Specifically, output cost information might be used in any of the following ways: 
•  As the basis for the formulation of output targets in a target-based system of performance 
budgeting, 
•  Equivalently, as the basis for determining the ‘price’ to be paid for outputs in an output-
purchase system (see below), 
•  As the basis for contingency supplementary funding arrangements for certain services 
where, if there is an unanticipated surge in demand/need, it is essential that extra services be 
delivered
5, 
•  As a tool to project the implications of future demand patterns for public expenditure, for the 
purposes of medium-term or longer-term budget planning
6.  (Output-based projection is 
commonly regarded as superior to simpler workload-based projection.)  
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These and related budgeting techniques will be referred to (albeit with certain reservations
7) 
as output budgeting.  The most radical versions of output budgeting have been the systems of 
output-purchase budgeting introduced at a whole-of-government level in Australia and New 
Zealand in the middle and late 1990s (Schick 1996; Department of Finance and Administration, 
1998; Robinson 2002).  These systems seek to put the whole government budget on a purchaser-
provider basis which mimics a simple competitive market.  Whereas the other techniques of 
output budgeting seek only to build an ex ante linkage between budgets and outputs, output-
purchase budgeting seeks also to create an ex post linkage: at least in theory, agencies are paid 
revenue by the government for the outputs which they actually produce, based upon a price 
which reflects the costs of efficient production.  In such a system, failure to deliver expected 
outputs, or delivery at excessive cost, will results in an agency recording an operating loss, just 
like a business.  This is intended to put strong pressure on the agency to achieve productive 
efficiency.  Output-purchase budgeting systems also operate at the sectoral (e.g. output-based 
hospital funding systems) and agency-level (e.g. Harr and Godfrey 1992) in a number of 
countries. 
Although the idea of using results cost information in budgeting is usually applied to 
outputs, occasionally there have been calls for its application to outcomes (e.g. Osborne and 
Gaebler 1993, 139)
 8.  It is, however, important not to make the mistake of regarding the type of 
sectoral outcome-linked supplementary performance payments (e.g. in university funding 
systems) referred to above as an attempt to budget using information on the cost of producing 
outcomes.  In these systems, the quantum of the outcome-linked performance payments in these 
systems tends to be essentially arbitrary, beyond being set at a level which is considered to 
provide an incentive for improved outcomes.  
  12
 
Having outlined these key contemporary themes in performance budgeting, we turn now to 
analysis and discussion of some of the issues raised by these themes. 
 
Using Results Cost Information in Budgeting 
Output budgeting implicitly assumes that there is a determinate relationship between the 
quantity of services of a defined quality and the cost of delivering those services.  This is what 
standard microeconomics assumes when it postulates output cost functions c = f(q) such that, for 
any value of q (the quantity of output), there is a unique corresponding value of c (the costs of 
efficient production)
 9.  The story of a determinate output/cost relationship is a pretty good 
characterization of mass-manufactured commodities, where standardized goods (i.e. good which 
are identical to one another) are produced in large runs. 
Having been raised on a diet of cost accounting doctrine which, as Brown, Myring and 
Gard (1999, 4) note, is rooted in “the private sector and, even more narrowly, in manufacturing 
industries”, management accountants also tend all too often to assume that government services 
are characterized by determinate output/cost relationships.  Once this assumption is made, the 
challenge appears to be purely one of quantifying the output/cost relationship.  Increasingly 
sophisticated techniques – such as activity-based budgeting – may then be applied to the task of 
demonstrating “clearly the relationship of [agency] budgets to quantity and quality of service” 
(Williams and Melhuish 1999, 28)
 10. 
There are many publicly-provided services for which there is indeed a reasonably 
determinate relationship between cost and outputs, and for which this approach therefore makes 
sense.  This is particularly the case for services which are relatively standardized – where the  
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activities delivered to one client/case are more or less the same as those delivered to others.  An 
example of a highly standardized service is motor license testing.  Each motor license candidate 
will be tested in the same, or a highly similar, manner – through, say, the administration of a 
standard written test followed by a practical driving test in a prescribed format.  There are many 
other publicly-provided services which, while not as standardized as this, are nevertheless 
relatively standardized.  School education provides, in most jurisdictions, a good example. 
There are, however, many other public services where the relationship between outputs 
and costs is characterized by significant indeterminacy.  As discussed elsewhere (Robinson 
2002), this is true for contingent capacity services and for some services affected by significant 
output heterogeneity.  Military and emergency services are good examples of contingent capacity 
services – these services must be provided quickly when needed, but demand for them is 
unpredictably irregular.  Budget funding is directed to providing a level of capacity to produce 
the service if and when needed, and may therefore bear little relationship to the actual services 
delivered.  Output heterogeneity refers to differences in the quantity and/or mix of activities per 
unit of output as a result of the tailoring of services in response to variations in client/case 
characteristics – and should not to be confused with quality variation.  Criminal investigation 
work by a police force offers a good practical illustration of output heterogeneity: the extent and 
type of investigative activity applied to, say, a murder case, varies considerably from case to case 
depending upon the circumstances of the case.  Heterogeneity will obviously produce significant 
variation in cost from one unit of output to another.  For there to be substantial indeterminacy in 
the output/cost relationship, however, it is necessary that output heterogeneity be severe enough 
to produce significant variability over time in average costs.    
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The phenomenon of qualitative rationing – affecting some services which are prone to 
significant short-run fluctuations in demand/need – is also highly relevant to the use of output 
budgeting techniques.  If there is to be a determinate relationship between output quantity and 
cost, quality must be held constant.  However, qualitative rationing – reductions in activity per 
client/case in order to permit more clients/cases to be handled with the same resources – is a 
strategy frequently used by government agencies to cope with unanticipated short-run increases 
in the need/demand in the presence of hard budget constraints.  Thus, for example, the extent of 
investigative activity undertaken in a particular murder case will be determined not only of the 
complexity of the case, but also of how heavy the pressure of other cases happens to be at the 
time
11. 
These considerations suggest that output budgeting will be potentially most useful in 
respect to services: 
•  which are more standardized (less heterogeneous), 
•  for which the quantity of outputs delivered is relatively stable and predicable (either because 
demand is relatively stable or, alternatively, because short-run demand surges are met not by 
qualitatitive rationing but by, say, longer waiting lists)
 12, 
Heterogeneity and qualitative rationing tend to present a particularly serious constraint on 
the scope for the successful introduction of output-purchase budgeting systems because in such 
systems agencies are paid the same price per unit of output.  The further serious constraint upon 
output-budgeting systems is the need for information on the efficient cost of production of 
outputs, upon which the ‘price’ paid to agencies is, in theory, based.  However, it is considerably 
more difficult to obtain information about efficient costs than it is to obtain information about an 
agency’s actual costs of production.  Market reference prices are available for only a small  
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minority of government-provided services.  Cost benchmarking – a process in which the costs of 
lower-cost producers are taken as an approximation of efficient cost – is a very valuable 
technique where it is available.  However, cost benchmarking can generally only be applied 
successfully and cost-effectively to services which are produced in large quantities through 
multiple production units – such as in the hospital system or the school system. 
It can therefore be argued that the pre-conditions for the successful operation of an output-
purchase budgeting system will be met only by a limited sub-set of publicly-provided services.  
Consequently, output-purchase systems are appropriate for sectoral performance budgeting 
systems applied to suitable categories of public services, but are not a suitable basis for the 
whole-of-government performance budgeting system (Robinson 2002).  
Output-purchase budgeting represents, however, only one type of output budgeting.  There 
is considerably wider scope for the use of other output budgeting techniques as part of a well-
designed performance budgeting system.  For example, heterogeneity and qualitative rationing 
represent somewhat less of a problem for a target-based performance budgeting system.  In such 
a system, it is both possible for output targets to be set in the knowledge that unanticipated 
variation in client/case complexity or of unanticipated demand surges might cause a divergence 
between actual output delivery and the target.  Indeed, in a target-based regime, it is desirable as 
far as possible to identify possible sources of this type of risk in advance in the strategic planning 
process.  Similarly, for the purposes of forward projections of public expenditure in multi-year 
expenditure planning, qualitative rationing responses due to short-run demand fluctuations are of 
no great significance if there is a reasonably clear underlying medium-term demand trend. 
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Similarly, output budgeting techniques other than output-purchase budgeting do not presume 
or require information about the ‘efficient’ cost of production.  They can be usefully applied 
using information on actual agency costs.   This is clearly true for output-based medium and 
long-term expenditure projections, as well as for formularized supplementary funding 
arrangements based upon output cost.  It is also, as discussed below, true for target-based 
performance budgeting systems. 
There is, thus, considerable scope for extending the use of output budgeting techniques.  It 
is, however, widely recognized that a well-designed performance budgeting system has to be 
explicitly focused upon outcomes as well as outputs.  Output budgeting can promote the efficient 
production of defined outputs, but does nothing to ensure that the right types of services are 
being delivered.  This is, indeed, precisely the reason why the focus under the US and British 
performance budgeting systems has in recent years moved increasingly towards a focus upon 
outcomes. 
Given the importance of outcomes, why not apply to broad principle of output budgeting to 
outcomes?  Why not, in other words, work out the cost of achieving outcomes and budget on that 
basis?  The idea is enormously appealing.  Unfortunately, however, a little serious thought will 
indicate that it generally not practicable.  Outcomes are only partially controllable by agencies: 
they are, as is well known, determined not only by the quality of the services delivered by 
agencies, but also by so-called ‘contextual factors’ – characteristics of clients or cases, or of the 
context in which services are delivered.  Where, as is frequently the case, these contextual factors 
are quite variable, the level of indeterminacy affecting the outcome/funding relationship will 
tend to be quite high, making it impossible to estimate in advance the likely cost of achieving 
any specific level of outcome.  Thus, for example, an outcome-purchase budgeting system (in  
  17
which agencies were funded solely upon the basis of a ‘price’ paid for outcomes delivered) 
would mean enormous, and unsustainable, volatility in agency funding.  It is precisely for this 
reason that the sectoral outcome-linked performance payments discussed above for the most part 
operate as sources of supplementary funding, over and above relatively stable ‘base’ funding. 
 
Target-Setting 
It is not enough merely to set performance targets, or even to publish those targets in the 
budget paper, for it to be said that a target-based system of performance budgeting exists.  It is 
necessary that there be a close link between targets and budgets.  The issue then is the precise 
nature of the link. 
In the British system, it is the nexus been funding increments and targeted performance 
improvements which is seen as the key link.  The strong outcomes focus of the British PSA 
targets is a strong point insofar as it keeps the focus upon the dimension of performance which 
ultimately matters most.  At the same time, the considerable indeterminacy which commonly 
affects the relationship between outcomes and costs suggests that the linkage between outcome 
targets and budgets must for most services be thought of as a loose one.  It is perhaps partly for 
this reason that some in Britain question the paramount role of the Treasury in managing the 
PSA target process (e.g. Talbot 2001).  This relates to a broader and quite familiar question, 
concerning the extent to which target-setting should focus upon performance variables which are 
relatively controllable.  There is a widely-held view that targets should not be set for the least 
controllable variables.  The concern is that setting targets for highly uncontrollable variables is 
more likely to de-motivate than to motivate agencies and their staff.  One British public health  
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administrator recently raised this point graphically in relation to a PSA target of reducing 
unwanted teenage pregnancies: 
“A recent systematic view concluded that we simply do not know how to do this: none of the current 
strategies work. ….. there can be few things more demoralizing to a committed workforce than setting 
objective that depend on knowledge that we do not yet have”  (Goodman 2002, 567) 
In a target-based performance budgeting system, it is common for targets to be set for 
outputs as well as outcomes.  Clearly, output target-setting tends to be less problematic than 
outcomes target-setting, because indeterminacy is a less severe problem.  In addition, the target-
setting approach to outputs has advantages over performance budgeting models which, like 
output-purchase budgeting, presuppose knowledge of the efficient costs of producing outputs.  
Targets for outputs to be produced with a given budget do not require knowledge of efficient 
output costs.  They simply require an informed belief (based, say, on efficiency reviews) in the 
feasibility of a certain target improvement on actual costs
13. 
Insofar as agencies and individuals within them are motivated to achieve targets, the issue 
arises of the potential for behavioral distortion arising from the use of targets based upon 
imperfect performance measures.  This problem should, of course, be minimized by careful 
design of, and the use of the right combination of, target measures.  However, all performance 
measures are imperfect to a greater or lesser degree, so that even the most careful design of the 
set of targets cannot eliminate the potential for behavioral distortion.  Indeed, the information-
based weakness of indicators and targets is a key reason for the failure of central economic 
planning (Nove 1984) and the superiority, in most markets, of consumer choice and other 
decentralized market mechanisms.  It is another reason why, where appropriate, it is better to 
deal with performance problems by transferring services from the tax-funded public sectors to 
market-based production and provision.  
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Given the continuing existence of a substantial public sector, the question is whether the 
potential behavioral distortions which can be the result of even well-designed performance 
targets constitute a conclusive case against target-based performance management and 
budgeting.  Many critics of the British PSA model appear to think so.  Some of these critics go 
so far as to tar the PSA system with the Soviet central planning brush, labeling it as ‘neo-
Stalinism’ (Keaney 2001)!  This criticism surely goes much too far.  The impact of formal 
performance targets has to be considered in the light of the adequacy or otherwise of the set of 
other informal and formal performance motivators upon which, in the absence of targets, 
exclusive reliance would need to be placed.  These other performance motivators include 
intrinsic motivators (the commitment of public employees to achieving results for the 
community), and also the (highly uneven) pressure upon agencies for results from their political 
masters.  The case for targets rests upon the proposition that these other motivators are 
inadequate, and that targets can help to compensate for their inadequacy and can also make a 
useful contribution to counterbalancing the more dysfunctional behavioral tendencies arising 
from the imperfect nature of the political system.  To support target-setting does not imply that 
one dismisses the importance of intrinsic motivators, which both research (e.g. Houston 2000) 
and common sense suggest are particularly important in the public sector.  Nor does it 
necessarily involve denying that democratic political institutions, even if imperfect, do create 
some important positive performance motivators. 
From this perspective, the real question is whether well-designed targets can operate so as 
to have the net effect of improving overall performance-orientation.  If so, then there is a good 
case for their use.  One aspect of this question is the extent to which ‘crowd out’ intrinsic 
motivators, and this in turn will depend significantly upon the nature and magnitude of the  
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incentives to which targets are linked.  This issue is discussed further below.  Certainly, 
however, there are strong theoretical and commonsense reasons to believe that the more 
imperfect are the performance measures upon which targets are based, the more mistaken it is to 
link achievement of those targets to incentives so powerful as to override other performance 
motivators.  In a private sector context, Deckop, Mangel and Cirka (1999) produce results which 
suggest that in organizations with high value-alignment, a well-designed performance pay 
system can complement ‘organizational citizenship’ behavior rather than weaken it.  In the 
public sector, it is precisely this type of effect which we should be seeking to achieve when 
setting performance targets and linking them to incentives.  The issues here are complex ones, 





So far, the principle focus has been upon the ex ante link between budgets and 
expected/planned results.  The idea of budgetary performance incentives raises the issue of the 
appropriate ex post link between results and budgets: in other words, how far, and in what way, 
should the actual results delivered by agencies impact upon their subsequent budgets? 
Clearly, allocative efficiency considerations call for a strong feedback from actual 
performance to future budgets.  If a major program is delivering poor outcomes – and there are 
no good grounds to believe that redesign, a management change, or better resourcing will fix the 
problem – then funding should be cut.  Good practice in performance budgeting therefore 
demands that mechanisms be built to make good performance information a crucial input into the 
budget process, not only at the finance ministry level, but at the highest political level of budget  
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decision-making.  A requirement that agencies integrate performance information into their 
budget submissions is one important part of this.  The Bush administration’s initiative to 
formally integrate performance review with budget decisions should be valuable in infusing 
performance information more systematically into the budget process in the US.  Other 
approaches have successfully been used by other nations. 
Agency budget allocations cannot, of course, be determined by past performance alone.  
There will be some services which should have their budgets cut over time notwithstanding 
excellent performance, because the service is one for which there is declining community need.  
Conversely, as many have pointed out in response to the Bush initiative (e.g. GAO 2002a, 14), 
some poorly performing programs need more rather than less funding.  It is therefore not 
surprising that some programs rated “ineffective” under the first round of PART were, 
appropriately, allocated more rather than less money in the President’s budget (GAO 2003, 6). 
Feeding information on agencies’ performance track records more systematically into 
central budget decisions is an important challenge.  However, the idea of budgetary ‘incentives’ 
surely implies something more than this.  Whether in the agency theory literature or in general 
usage, an ‘incentive’ refers to a reward or sanction which constitutes an extrinsic motivator, as 
distinct from value-driven intrinsic motivators.  Incentives particularly refer to remuneration 
(whether cash or ‘perks’), and include sanctions such as termination of employment.     
Performance incentives operate through their impact upon the motivation of individual 
employee.  If, therefore, agency budget funding is to operate as a performance incentive, there 
must be a significant connection between performance-linked agency funding and incentives for 
individual employees.  Individual employees must, moreover, have prior knowledge of that 
connection if the agency budgetary ‘incentive’ to motivate them to perform better.  
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The question then is by what channels such a connection between agency funding and 
individual incentives might be created.  It is true that taking an agency’s performance track 
record into account in determining its budget creates one limited channel connecting agency 
funding and individual incentives, because individuals will generally have a personal interest in 
avoiding the closure of their program arising from a central perception of poor program 
performance and a consequent agency budget cut.  However, a system of incentives requires 
positive rewards as well as sanctions
15.  How, then, might agency budgetary rewards feed 
through to rewards for individuals? 
It would undesirable to rely for positive incentives upon the indirect link between 
individual remuneration and budget size which arises from the tendency for managers with larger 
program responsibilities and bigger budgets to be paid more.  Such an approach would not only 
be inconsistent with allocative efficiency considerations, but it would also push government 
more in the direction of a public choice model in which the incentive structures faced by public 
officials create an unproductive drive to empire-build. 
This suggests that if budgetary performance ‘incentives’ are to be created, it must be in a 
manner which keeps allocative decisions and performance incentives separate.  The obvious 
option therefore is the payment to agencies of explicit budgetary performance bonuses as 
supplementary funding (over and above core program funding), with the agency bonus 
earmarked for the payment of performance bonuses to agency employees.  The Ontario 
provincial government in Canada is one – possibly the only – government to have introduced 
such a system (GAO 2002b:,20).  
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One difficulty here is the significant constraint upon the scope for performance pay in the 
public sector due to the lack of a strong link at the aggregate level between public sector 
performance and public sector tax revenue.  In order to comply with the hard budget constraint 
which dependence upon tax revenue makes necessary, an essentially arbitrary ceiling must be set 
for the pool of money available across the whole budget sector for performance pay.  This makes 
public sector performance pay ultimately more or less zero-sum in nature.  In most public sector 
performance pay systems, performance pay is zero-sum at the individual agency level as well as 
at the government-wide level, because the pool of money available for performance pay in each 
agency is unrelated to agency performance
16.  Introducing agency-level budgetary performance 
incentives – agency-level performance pay – could change this, by making the size of agency 
performance pay pools to some degree variable with agency performance.  The scope for 
recognition of agency performance through agency-level performance pay will, however, always 
remain constrained by the government-wide performance pay ceiling.  This contrasts markedly 
with the position of firms selling their products in markets, for which strong performance 
translates directly into strong earnings and a capacity to pay excellent performance bonuses to 
staff. 
Agency-level performance pay raises a number of other issues, many of which have been 
widely discussed in relation to individual performance rating and pay.  Prominent amongst these 
is, once again, the implications of imperfect performance measurement.  If they are to be used to 
determine agency-level performance pay, agency performance ratings must be of an excellent 
quality and highly credible to the agencies affected.  Legitimate doubts can be raised about how 
far this is possible given the very considerable performance measurement difficulties which 
characterize much of the public sector.  
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In the US, the PART ratings have been widely criticized as superficial.  Insofar as an 
instrument like PART is used purely as a tool to improved allocative decision-making – rather 
than as an instrument in an incentive structure – this criticism perhaps misses the point.  It is 
essential to good central budget formulation that the center forms a view of agency program 
performance.  Given informational constraints, this view will be unavoidably superficial.   
Whatever its weaknesses, a formal assessment approach like PART can represent a major 
improvement in the way in which agency performance is assessed by the center – particularly 
because, in the words of one former senior OMB official, “it creates consistency across the 
board, so each [budget] examiner is looking at the same thing”(quoted in Weinstock, 2003, 38) . 
A snapshot assessment like PART is, therefore, valuable tool in allocative decision-
making.  If, however, agency performance ratings are to be used to determine agency-level 
performance pay which is in turn articulated with individual performance pay, the problem of 
‘superficial’ performance ratings is a much more serious one.  Performance pay which is based 
upon highly imperfect performance measures may well damage, rather than improve, employee 
motivation. 
This analysis suggests that one should be generally cautious about the idea of budgetary 
performance ‘incentives’.  Certainly, the idea requires extensive further research and evaluation. 
 
Conclusion 
Performance budgeting models developed over the last decade have sought to create 
tighter links between results and budgets.  This paper has focused upon target-based models, the  
  25
use of cost information about results (in particular, output budgeting techniques) and budgetary 
‘incentives’ for performance. 
One factor influencing the scope for linking results and funding is the determinacy of the 
underlying results/cost relationship.  In the case of outcomes, this relationship is generally a 
loose one.  For outputs, on the other hand, many public sector services are characterized by 
output/cost relationships which are at least moderately determinate, and this creates considerable 
scope for the increased use of output budgeting techniques.  These include output-based forward 
expenditure projections in the context of multi-year expenditure planning, budget-linked output 
targets, and formularized output-based contingency funding for selected high-priority services.  
On the other hand, the preconditions for the effective use of the other key form of output 
budgeting – output-purchase budgeting – are quite restrictive.  Output-purchase budgeting is 
therefore only appropriate for a carefully selected sub-set of government services.  It must also 
be recognized in relation to output budgeting generally that there are many public sector services 
for which output budgeting techniques are not, for reasons such as severe heterogeneity and the 
‘contingent capacity’ nature of the services concerned, applicable. 
The idea of budgetary performance ‘incentives’ is problematic, and further experience 
with some of the new budgetary incentive systems will be valuable in making their efficacy 
clearer.  What is clear at this stage, however, is that performance information should be 
systematically infused into the central budget-making process, so as to make sectoral budget 
allocations performance-sensitive as well as policy-based.  This requires, amongst other things, 
that agencies integrate performance information into budget submissions, and that finance 






1. 'Performance information systems' in this context means, at a minimum, a developed system 
of quantitative performance measures/indicators.  Commonly, however, performance 
information systems will include other elements, such as program evaluation systems, formal 
benchmarking processes, output and activity costing models, and overall agency performance 
ratings. 
2. One example of an effective model here is the cabinet-level Expenditure Review Committee 
(ERC) in Australia.  The ERC, which comprises the finance minister and a number of ministers 
with major spending portfolios, oversees sectoral expenditure allocations in the light of 
politically-determined priorities, while making no attempt at comprehensive expenditure 
planning.  Although detailed expenditure reviews are undertaken as part of the ERC process, 
these are selective, and tend to focus on one or more broad policies areas each year (often of a 
cross-portfolio nature).  Other countries, of course, achieve the same broad result by other 
mechanisms.  The British biennial Spending Review mechanism (UK Government 2002b) is, for 
example, is a particularly good example. 
3. In its initial iteration, the program performance assessment generated by PART was heavily 
influenced by process issues as well as by results achieved.  At time of writing, it looks as if 
results assessments will be separated from process assessments in the next iteration of PART, 
following advice from (amongst others) the Performance Measurement Advisory Council. 
4. In the words of one Treasury minister, "there was never any question that: 'oh if we don't meet 
this target, our money's going to be cut'" (Crooks and Blitz 2002). 
5. Such arrangements are a positive ancillary feature of the Australian accrual output budgeting 
system.  By way of example, if there is an unexpected surge in illegal immigrants subject to 
mandatory detention, the relevant department is automatically provided with additional funding 
on a formularized per-capita basis. 
6. For example, information upon cost-per-student-year can be used, together with demographic 
projections, to estimate the costs in future years of existing (or modified) educational policies. 
7. The problem which must be noted here is that the term ‘output budgeting’ has historically 
been used in a wide variety of ways, and therefore arguably lacks precision.  For example, at the 
time of the first wave of program budgeting in the 1960s and 1970s, program budgeting was 
often referred to as a system of output budgeting.  It was, however, commonplace at the time for 
the term ‘output’ to be used to refer to what we today define as outcomes (Robinson 2003), so 
that the use at that time of the phrase ‘output budgeting’ label did not imply an attempt to use 
output cost functions to link the expected/planned quantity of services to the level of budget 
funding. 
8. Perhaps not choosing its words very carefully, an OMB presentation to the Performance 
Measurement Advisory Council in 2002 appeared to come close to the idea of budgeting in terms 
of outcome costs.  It described the “full cost budgeting” initiative in the following terms: 
“Agency capacity to describe the full cost, at the margin, of getting results. The agency must be 
able to articulate the costs of increments of change and the unit costs of achieving outcomes” 
(italics added) (OMB 2002). 
9.  There are, to be more precise, two textbook cost functions – short-run and long run – both of 
which are fully determinate.  In each of these, there are known stable parameters – such as input 
costs and the state of technology – which are assumed to be constant. 
10. Although all too often, it is simplistically presumed that unit output cost data will do the job.  
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11. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Robinson (2003). 
12. Another important consideration is how well-defined are the desired outputs to be produced 
by the agency.  In principle, an administrative arrangement which separates ‘steering’ and 
‘rowing’ – such as the separation of policy-oriented departments and service-delivery executive 
agencies under the British Next Steps system – is well-suited to a sectoral output budgeting 
system.  These pre-conditions are closely related to the general criteria for the success of results-
based control mechanisms, as well discussed in Merchant’s (1985) and Tankersley and Grizzle 
(1994, 8-9). 
13.   It is interesting in this context to note that the British PSA superceded a somewhat more 
output-focused approach, under which agencies were required to produce Output and 
Performance Analysis (OPA) statements (Talbot 1998). 
14. Consideration of the issue is not assisted by the relative neglect in the literature of public 
sector performance motivation issues (Wright 2001).  
15. And also more finely-tuned sanctions. 
16. For example, the government might provide each agency with a performance pay pool set as 
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